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Abstract
This paper argues that the technology of Grid computing has not yet been adopted
by enterprises due to the lack of viable business models. While in academia, Grid
technology has already been taken up, the sharing approach among non for-profit
organizations is not suitable for enterprises. In this paper, the idea of a Grid
market is taken up to overcome this Grid adoption gap. Although this idea is not
new, all previous proposals have been made either by computer scientists being
unaware of economic market mechanisms or by economists being unaware of the
technical requirements and possibilities. This paper is unique as it derives an
economically sound set of market mechanisms based on a solid understanding of
the technical possibilities.
Keywords: Electronic markets, grid computing, business models

1 Introduction
Despite much criticism in the past, Grid computing is increasingly gaining
traction in a number of application areas. Grid computing denotes a computing
model that distributes processing across an administratively and locally dispersed
infrastructure. By connecting many heterogeneous computing resources, virtual
computer architectures are created, increasing the utilization of otherwise idle
resources (Foster et al. 2001).
By means of Grid computing, it is possible to set up virtual supercomputers via
the connection of normal servers that cost no more than $3000 each. Adding and
removing servers is simple granting extreme flexibility in building up
infrastructures. The most salient example of what Grid computing can achieve is
illustrated by its prominent predecessor SETI@home. SETI@home connected
over one million computers spread across 226 countries to reach processing power
of 418.6 TFLOPS in its peak time (Cirne et al. 2006). For comparison, the world’s
fastest supercomputer, IBM BlueGene/L, has an estimated total processing power
of between 280 and 267 TFLOPS (http://www.top500.org/), while Google's
search engine system can muster between 126 and 316 TFLOPS estimated total
processing power. While Grids allow enormous potential by aggregating idle
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resources that are geographically distributed, for businesses it has furthermore
been projected that Grids may decrease total IT costs by 30 % (Minoli 2004).
The report “Grid Computing: A Vertical Market Perspective 2005-2010”
(Insight Research 2004) estimates an increase of worldwide Grid spending from
$714.9 million in 2005 to approximately $19.2 billion in 2010. Despite existing
Grid technology and commercial needs, up till now, almost all research efforts
have been focusing on using Grids within academic communities. One of the most
prominent activities in academia is the EGEE project (Enabling Grids for
eScience, http://www.eu-egee.org/) which is funded by the European
Commission. EGEE is developing a service Grid infrastructure which is suitable
for any scientific research especially where the time and resources needed for
running the applications are considered impractical when using traditional IT
infrastructures (e.g. weather forecasts, protein folding etc). With a funding of over
30 million €, the established EGEE Grid comprises over 20,000 CPUs and 5
Petabytes of storage.
While the adoption of Grid technology in eScience has been prospering, the
adoption by companies has been slow, mainly due to the lack of viable business
models coupled with chargeable Grid services. What is needed is a set of
mechanisms that enable users to discover, negotiate, and pay for the use of Grid
services on-demand. According to The451Group, one of the leading Grid research
institutes, the application of resource trading and allocation models is one of the
crucial success factors for establishing commercial Grids (Fellows et al. 2007).
Quite recently, Sun Microsystems has adopted the idea of trading resources,
believing that companies will eventually stop maintaining their own infrastructure
and instead buy computing power off a Grid1. To put weight on this idea, Sun
plans to build up an electronic marketplace for trading resources. Sun started off
with offering a fixed price for computing services of $1 per CPU hour. Amazon is
currently launching comparable initiatives with Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud
(Amazon EC2) and Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3).
Hitherto, electronic marketplaces for Grid resources have not yet taken off – there
are very few customers using Sun’s fixed price offer. But what is the reason for
this limited success of Grid markets? Almost every large computer hardware
manufacturer like HP, Sun, or Intel has already worked on or at least pondered the
options for Grid markets, but still no Grid market has successfully been launched,
creating a Grid adoption gap.
This paper attempts to explain why Grid markets initiatives have failed so far in
the conception phase of development already. The explanation mainly focuses on
the object that is being traded on Grid markets. As a result of this analysis, it is
discovered that not only one single Grid market is necessary but a set or catalogue
of different marketplaces satisfying the diverse needs of different market
segments. This paper provides a roadmap towards such a catalogue of market
mechanisms. As such, this paper provides guidance for potential Grid market
operators (e.g. Telecom companies such as France Telecom for Mobile Grids, or
hardware vendors such as Sun for Computational and Data Grids) in the choice of
1

The idea of introducing markets for scheduling computer resources is by far not a new idea. First
suggestions have been made in the mid 60s (Smidt 1968). But despite that markets have not yet
made their way into applied scheduling mechanisms.
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the market mechanisms that are needed to gear up Grid computing for enterprise
usage.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses possible
ways to define the trading object in Grid markets and thus forms the background
of the discussion on market mechanisms. Section 3 explores whether one
marketplace alone is sufficient for meeting the needs of the Grid providers and
users. As a result of section 3, a two-tiered market structure with two classes of
markets is proposed as a viable solution for enterprise Grids. Section 4 discusses
the use of different market mechanisms for this two tiered market structure and
shows which mechanisms are most adequate for which kind of application.
Section 5 concludes the paper with a summary and points to future work.

2 Background
Applications can be deployed either by directly accessing resources that are
distributed over the network or by invoking a Grid service which encapsulates the
respective resources behind standardized interfaces. These two alternative ways of
deployment give rise to totally different requirements for potential markets.
From a technical point of view, resources are simple to describe as there exists
only a finite set of resources. A resource may be defined by the operating system
(e.g. Linux OS), number of CPUs (e.g. 4 * x86 CPU), memory (e.g. 128MB
RAM) etc. The GLUE schema provides a standardized vocabulary for describing
computing elements. The standardization of resources offers a simple way to
semantically describe them. This in turn alleviates resource discovery, as
matchmaking is straightforward.
Services on the other hand can be extremely difficult to describe as the service
space is infinite due to the myriads of variants in service design. For the
description of complex services on the collective layer domain-dependent
ontologies can be used, if existent. In the case of raw services, i.e. resource-near
services, standardized languages such as JSDL exist. Nonetheless, the indefinite
search space tremendously exacerbates service description and likewise service
discovery of complex services.
Both resources and services are provided on the basis of Quality-of-Service (QoS)
assertions. For resources, the QoS description is simple, as only standardized
properties and the duration of resource access matter. For services, however, QoS
is more difficult, as not only time aspects play a role but also precision and
accuracy of the services. The definition of precision and accuracy depends on the
service and cannot be standardized. This also has ramifications on monitoring.
While monitoring resource access is relatively simple, the monitoring of very
complex services becomes particularly demanding when services are intertwined.
Figure 1 shows the different aggregation levels of services and resources with
respect to the layers of the Grid Protocol Architecture. At the bottom are the
physical resources on which the services are executed. These resources may be
CPUs, memory, sensors, other hardware and software or even aggregated
resources such as clusters (e.g. Condor cluster) and designated computing nodes.
Raw services are resource-near services (such as storage services). They access
resources via standardized interfaces. Raw services also comprise standard
application services which could potentially be standardized. Non standardized
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application services are complex services which are so diverse that they cannot
reasonably be standardized.
Grid Protocol Architecture

Application
Complex Services
Raw Services
API/SDK
CPU

RAM

HDD

Condor Beowulf…

Figure 1: Grid Protocol Architecture and the different aggregation levels of services and
resources

The deployment of applications is orchestrated via Grid services using existing
Grid middleware (e.g. Globus). Typically, services are allocated by the global
resource broker that can act as a meta-scheduler to local nodes, where the job
requests are queued and executed by batch schedulers of the local resource
manager.
When relying on resources, the executables need to be transferred as well.
Resources can be deployed as services – in this case the resource providers have
to guarantee the completion of the service at a given point of time. Likewise
services can be deployed as resources, where the executables need to be
transferred to the resource fabric (e.g. Condor cluster). Typically, state-of-the-art
Grid middleware does only support limited resource management functionalities.
In most cases, the middleware does not enforce any policies concerning how
many resources a job can consume because there is no way for the local
administrators to specify the degree to which resources can be shared. Trading
resources is thus difficult to achieve by means of Grid middleware. Trading
resources is possible when it happens on the operating system level, which
supports effective resource management. So-called Grid Operating systems,
henceforth Grid OS, (e.g. MOSIX) support resource management on the OS
Kernel level, and are potentially available for setting up markets (Stoesser et al.
2007). The nice thing about Grid OS is that applications need not be altered to get
them ready for the Grid, as is the case when Grid middleware are being used.
From an economic perspective resource markets are promising for automation via
an organized electronic market. There are standardized items for sale that
potentially attract many buyers and sellers. Complex services have again a
disadvantage as demand is highly specialized and distributed across niche
markets, such that only few potential buyers are interested in the same or related
services. Nonetheless, demand for complex services is huge compared to demand
for resources as most of the potential users are interested in getting their services
executed, no matter how many physical resources will be needed.
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3 One market fits all?
In this section, it will be explored whether it is sufficient to build up and operation
one single market for Grids. Based on the previous background description, the
answer to this question is straightforward: Designing one Grid market for all kinds
of resources, from physical resources such as processing power, memory and
storage running on native platforms to sophisticated virtual resources or services,
bundling and enriching such physical resources, seems inappropriate due to both
technical and economical factors.
a) Technical factors
From the technical point of view, differences in the monitoring and
deployment of services and resources exist such that it is very difficult to
devise a generic system that is capable of supporting all kinds of resource and
service trading. Even worse, different deployment mechanisms impose
different requirements on the market mechanism.
b) Economical factors
From the economic point of view, market mechanisms need to achieve the
following standard objectives in mechanism design (Stößer, Neumann et al.
2007, cf. Table 1).
Objective

Description

Allocative
efficiency

Allocative efficiency is the overall goal of market mechanisms
for Grid resource allocation. A mechanism is allocatively
efficient if it maximizes the utility across all participating users
(welfare or overall “happiness”).

Budgetbalance

A mechanism is budget-balanced if it does not need to be
subsidized by outside payments.

Computational
tractability

The market mechanism needs to be computed in polynomial run
time in the size of the number of resource requests and offers.

Truthfulness

Truthfulness means that it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for
users to reveal their true valuations to the mechanism.

Individual
rationality

A mechanism is individually rational if users cannot suffer a loss
in utility from participating in the mechanism, i.e. it is
individually rational to participate.

Table 1: Economic Objectives

As mentioned in the background discussion, trading resources and services
imposes totally different requirements on the market: while resources are more
or less a commodity for which auction mechanisms seem to work well,
(complex) services are inherently non-standardized making auction-like
mechanisms inapplicable. But even for trading resources it substantially
matters how they are deployed.
From this brief discussion, it can be stated that a one-size-fits-all market for Grids
is infeasible from both the technical as well as from the economic side. Instead,
due to their heterogeneous properties, Grids can be divided into two different
types of markets: resource markets and service markets spanning out a “two tiered
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Grid market structure”2. In the following, these two classes of markets are
analyzed in terms of their requirements on the market structure3 (cf. Figure 2).
Complex
Service Market

Raw Service Market

Application

Complex
Service

Raw Service

Application

Complex
Service

Raw Service

Application

Complex
Service

Resource

Application

Complex
Service

Resource

Physical Resource Market

Grid Users

Integrators

Tier 2

Resource Provider

Tier 1

Figure 2: Two-tiered market structure



Tier 1-Markets
On the physical resource market, low-level resources are traded such as
processing power, memory, and storage. Demand in the resource market is
enfolded by complex services that need resources to be executed. This setting
poses special requirements on the used market mechanism (Schnizler et al.
2006). However, as aforementioned, the requirements also depend on the way
resources are being deployed due to technical restrictions.
Deployment as resource
The technical requirements stemming from the way of deployment are listed
in Table 2.
Requirement

2

Description

Multi-attributes

Physical resources, either deployed as raw service or as
resource, have quality attributes such as speed of the CPU,
the operating platform or bandwidth. Thus the mechanism
needs to cope with multi-attributes.

Bids on bundles

Generally, users require a combination of resources to
execute a job (e.g. CPU and memory). If the mechanism
does not account for bids on bundles, the user is facing to
the risk of obtaining only one leg of this bundle without the
other (the so called “exposure risk”). The market
mechanism thus needs to support requests for bundles of

We use the term „market structure“ to denote the configuration of marketplaces.
It should be noted that there could be n-intermediate markets. We consider only the extreme
ones, as they exhibit different characteristics.
3
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resources.
Online mechanism

The allocation of the mechanism needs to be made
instantaneously, as the market assumes the role of operating
system schedulers. The mechanism thus needs to be a
lightweight mechanism that requires little computation time.
Being an online mechanisms is crucial because in the case of
an decrease of the performance of an application requires an
adaptation to a new execution state, new resources need to
be found and scheduled for immediate execution.

Split-proof

Typically, Grid OS are migrating jobs from one resource to
another. The mechanism needs to be split-proof in a sense
that users cannot improve their priority by splitting jobs into
more parts .

Merge-proof

Likewise, the mechanism needs to assure that no users have
advantages through the merger of jobs.

Table 2: Requirements for trading resources

Deployment as raw service
The technical requirements stemming from the way of deployment are listed
in Table 3.
Requirement

Description

Multi-attributes

See above

Bids on bundles

See above

Time attributes

When raw services are traded the market mechanism needs
to take time attributes into account. The requesters need to
specify their demand, so that the market mechanism can
efficiently schedule the job requests according to availability
of resources and to the price. This differs from trading
resources, where the market mechanism executes jobs upon
availability.

Co-Allocation

Capacity-demanding Grid applications usually require the
simultaneous allocation of several homogenous service
instances from different providers. For example, a largescale simulation may require several computation services to
be completed at one time. This situation where simultaneous
allocation of multiple homogenous services is called coallocation. A mechanism for the service market has to enable
co-allocations and provide functionality to control it.

Coupling

For some applications, it may be logical to couple multiple
raw services of a bundle in order to guarantee that these are
allocated from the same seller and will be executed on the
same machine. The mechanism ideally offers this
functionality.

Resource Isolation

Security and performance considerations lead to the
requirement of resource isolation. In fact, it can only be
assured that an application satisfies a given QoS or security
level, respectively in case the resources on which the
application is executed are committed only to one party.
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Table 3: Requirements for trading raw resources



Tier 2-Markets
In the service market, applications demand the execution of their constituting
complex services. Along the lines of the two-tiered market structure, complex
services can be decomposed into smaller services that can in turn be translated
into resources that are necessary for executing them. E.g., some complex
service might require a basic XML Transformer service which in turn needs
processing power, memory, storage etc. Buyers in such a service market
request a complex service – the provider of this service, the service integrator,
is responsible for obtaining the required raw services and physical resources in
turn, thus hiding parts of the Grid’s complexity from the buyer. Such a
hierarchical shading of complexity seems to be an appropriate approach since
service requesters typically have no clue how much resources the complex
service will consume (Eymann et al. 2006).
The requirements on the market mechanism are totally different than for
resource markets. Complex services are rarely used by two different
companies – installing competition hence does not make sense. The service
market rather imposes the difficulty to find a counterpart that is exactly
offering the capabilities to execute the job. The market mechanism is more
search-oriented such as bilateral or multi-lateral negotiation protocols (cf.
Table 4).
Requirement

Description

Multi-attributes

See above

Workflow support

To support complex services, distributed resources such as
computational devices, data, and applications need to be
orchestrated while managing the application workflow
operations within Grid environments. The marketmechanism needs to account for this during design time and
run time of the workflow.

Scalability

Scalability considers how the properties of a protocol
change, as the size of a system (i.e. the participants in the
Grid) increases. The market mechanism needs to be scalable
per se in order to be applicable.

Co-Allocation

See above

Table 4: Requirements for trading complex services

The problem with current markets for Grid is that they are designed as resource
markets. For example Sun’s $1/CPU-hour advertisement campaign aims at selling
physical resources, i.e. CPU hours. This type of market is, however, by design not
relevant for enterprise customers who have deadlines to meet until when a job
needs to be executed and have no idea of how many physical resources are
required to meet the deadline. While enterprises typically have time critical jobs to
execute, applications in academia are less time dependent. As such, resource
markets where would be viable business models – here the users have to wait until
the queued jobs are being executed. But clearly, the issue of payment for
resources is controversially discussed in academia. In the future, even for the
EGEE Grid, billing and payment will soon become an issue as demand exceeds
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supply. It seems that resource markets will become an adequate model for
academia Grids such as EGEE or D-Grid, the German Grid initiative.
Grid markets that will be widely accessed by enterprises need to be of the form of
service markets on which complex services are offered. For example a
manufacturer is interested in executing a Computer Aided Design application and
deploying it on a computation intense platform. This complex service showcases a
very specific service which is likely to be demanded from one single requester
only. To accommodate this complex service, the service must be decomposed into
its constituting raw services and further on to the physical resource demand.
Integrators are needed to facilitate this decomposition process, where integrators
denote companies which are specialized in aggregating and disaggregating
services into resources. Specialization stems from experience, allowing the
identification of the service needs by comparing it with similar services in the
past, where similarity is established in terms of algorithms, data structures and
sizes, etc. Telecommunication companies and hardware producers seeking to
virtualize IT infrastructures naturally have a strong interest and the competency to
become such integrators.
Table 5 summarizes the discussion above.
Trading Object
Physical Resource
Market
Structure
Deployment
Description
languages
Time limits
Application
areas
Requirements

Tier 1-market

Complex Application
Service
Tier 2-market

Resource
GLUE

Raw Service
JSDL/RSL

Service
Domain-dependent
ontologies
Yes

No

yes

Academia

Integrators and
resource
providers

All enterprises

Multi-attributes,
Bids on bundles,
Online
mechanism,
Split-proof,
Merge-proof

Multi-attributes,
Bids on bundles,
Time attributes,
Co-Allocation,
Coupling,
Resource
Isolation

Multi-attributes,
Workflow support,
Scalability,
Co-Allocation

Table 5: Grid Market Types

4 A Roadmap for Grids
In the previous sections, we have motivated that Grids require not something like
a Global Grid market where all Grid requests and supplies are collected, but a
more complex two-tiered market structure. Figure 2 summarizes the market
structure. On the resource market complex services require physical resources
either plainly deployed or accessed via service interfaces. Applications demand
the execution of several complex services. Integrators assume the responsibility of
mediating between the applications being unaware of their resource need and the
resources themselves.
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In the following we will set up a taxonomy of known market mechanisms which
support different types of Grid applications. This taxonomy is conceived to be a
roadmap for further Grid Market developments that help bridging the adoption
gap.
1.1.

Market Mechanisms for Trading Resources

For Grids, where resources (and not services) are traded, no time restrictions
apply. Usually, not the resources itself are traded but shares of computing units
(e.g. nodes). The idea is that bidding determines the share the user receives from
the pool of available nodes. The more resources a user obtains, the faster the
application is completed. Since no time restrictions apply, batch and interactive
applications can be served by the same market mechanisms.
The following online mechanisms apply for resource-based systems:


Fair Share (Kay and Lauder 1988)



Proportional Share (Lai et al. 2004)



Pay-as-bid (Sanghavi and Hajek 2005; Bodenbenner et al. 2007)

Obviously, there are mechanisms available that serve resource markets on the
Grid OS level. All three groups of mechanisms, however, have the same
drawback, as they can be used in scenarios only where one resource provider
serves several consumers. There is no competition among the providers. In case
all resources are under fully centralized control, this is unproblematic. But in
Grids, the underlying idea is to cross administrative boundaries. Apparently, there
is a need for market mechanisms that satisfy all requirements of the resource
market.
1.2.

Market Mechanisms for Trading Services

Dividing the service market into two parts – raw and complex services – however,
is too simplistic, as the timing when demand for services occurs has not yet been
considered. This timing is determined by the application itself and depends on the
task the application is performing. We use the term application model as a
characterization of the processing mode of the application. This encompasses in
particular the workload of the application as well as the interaction model between
applications and the Grid middleware virtualizing the execution platform.
Depending on the application model, different requirements upon the market
mechanisms emerge.


Batch applications are characterized by a planned execution and expected
termination time (e.g. data mining). Execution is serial and resource demands
depend on the parameters, such as the size of input data.



Interactive applications are applications that require services on demand,
depending on the interactions with users (e.g. online data analysis). Different
than batch applications, with interactive applications it is not possible to plan
execution and expected termination time far in advance, so there can be
unpredictable peaks of requests occurring within a short time.



Task-oriented applications are dynamically composed from tasks to build
more complex tasks. Service demand depends on the (work-) flow of requests
from multiple users (e.g. transaction system of a bank constitutes).
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Most of the market-based approaches relate to batch applications. Batch
applications are comparably easy for two main reasons. Firstly, there is no need to
consider a whole workflow with different resource demands on each echelon of
the workflow. Secondly, the time to determine the allocation can be relatively
long; immediacy is not essential. Thus, complex resource allocation computations
can be performed without hampering the whole application due to latency times
devoted to the calculation of the optimal allocation. Even worse, most of the
practical market-based Grid prototypes consider only one single resource type
(e.g. CPU only) and thus make use of standard auctions (e.g. English auction). In
applications other than pure number crunching those auction types are inadequate
as more than one object (e.g. memory) is required at the same time.
4.2.1.

Market Mechanisms for Trading Raw Services

As mentioned above, the market mechanisms for raw services depend on the
application model. In the following we discuss the mechanisms that are adequate
for batch applications.


Multi-attribute Combinatorial Auction (Bapna et al. 2006)



Multi-attribute Exchange (Stoesser, Neumann et al. 2007)



MACE-mechanism (Schnizler et al. 2006)



Combinatorial Scheduling Exchange (AuYoung et al. 2004)



Augmented Proportional Share (Stoica et al. 1996)

For interactive applications it is impossible to predict demand for raw services.
Thus, the mechanisms need to allocate the raw services continuously. This can be
realized by either frequent call mechanisms, where bids are collected for a very
short time span and right away cleared. This requires that the mechanism is
solvable in few milliseconds. Alternatively, the mechanism could be an online
mechanism, which allows the real-time job submission to available resources (e.g.
nodes or clusters). A third way is to introduce a derivative market to insure against
the risk of supernormal resource demand.


Multi-attribute Combinatorial Auction Heuristic (Bapna, Das et al. 2006)



Multi-attribute Exchange (Stoesser, Neumann et al. 2007)



Online scheduling mechanism (Heydenreich et al. 2006; Stoesser et al. 2007)



Augmented Proportional Share (Stoica, Abdel-Wahab et al. 1996)



Derivative Markets (Kenyon and Cheliotis 2002; Rasmusson 2002)

The requirements on market mechanisms that support task-oriented applications
are very demanding, as all constituents of the workflow needs to be allocated –
otherwise the application has no value to the user. Currently, there are only
bargaining protocols available that guides the user in its search for all components
of the workflow.


Bargaining Protocol (Czajkowski et al. 2002)
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4.2.2. Market Mechanisms for Trading Complex Services

As stated earlier, trading complex services is very demanding as there are not
many providers and requesters. Currently, there is not much research available
that aims at developing market mechanisms for trading complex services. Hence,
the market mechanisms for batch, interactive and task-oriented applications do not
differ substantially.
For batch applications there are three different market mechanisms suitable,
where the first one, MACE, provides a sufficiently rich bidding language for
supporting complex services. The second mechanism is the bargaining protocol,
while the last one refers to take-it-or-leave-it pricing, where the vendor sets the
price and the users decide whether or not to purchase.


MACE-mechanism (Schnizler, Neumann et al. 2006)



Bargaining Protocol (Czajkowski, Foster et al. 2002)



Software-as-a-service4 (SaaS)

Interactive applications make the design of adequate market mechanisms even
more difficult. Potentially, the following mechanisms could be used.


Bargaining Protocol (Czajkowski, Foster et al. 2002)



Software-as-a-service (SaaS)



Online scheduling mechanism (Heydenreich, Müller et al. 2006; Stoesser,
Roessle et al. 2007)

As mentioned before, task-oriented applications are very demanding due to the
exposure risks involved. Mechanisms that could be used for trading are bargaining
protocols and SaaS. It should be pointed out that there is currently no research on
this field available.


Bargaining Protocol (Czajkowski, Foster et al. 2002)



Software-as-a-service (SaaS)

5 Conclusion
This paper argues that the technology of Grid computing has not yet been adopted
by enterprises due to the absence of viable business models. In academia, Grid
technology has already been taken up, but the sharing approach among non forprofit organizations cannot be transferred to enterprises. We pick up the idea of a
Grid market to overcome the adoption gap. This idea is not new by any means,
but hitherto all proposals that have been made by computer scientists unaware of
economic algorithms and models or by economists being unaware of the technical
possibilities. This paper attempts to derive an economically sound set of market
mechanisms based on a solid understanding of the technical possibilities.
Section 2 analyzed the nature of the object that can be traded in Grids. As shown
in the paper, the nature of the trading object is closely associated with the
deployment of software applications. Deployment as resource or as service has
4

Software-as-a-service refers more to model of software delivery where a service provider (e.g.
SAP) offers to requesters applications that are specifically implemented for one-to-many hosting.
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major ramifications on the trading object and consequently on the requirements on
market mechanisms. Resources are essentially commodities, where services can
be both standardized commodities (i.e. raw services) and non-standardized unique
entities (i.e. complex services).
Based on the subsequent analysis, this paper derived a two-tiered market structure
where all markets on each tier demand for different market mechanisms. The first
tier comprises the markets for physical resources (e.g. CPU, memory) that can be
accessed either as resource or as raw service. The second tier comprises the
markets for complex services.
Section 3 showed the requirements on the market mechanisms depending on the
tier of the market structure. Section 4 introduced which mechanisms are suitable
for what area. Table 6 summarizes the set of market mechanisms that can be used
depending on the application and respective tier within the market structure.
Physical Resource
Application
model
Batch

Interactive

Task-oriented

Resource

Fair Share
Proportional
Share
Sanghavi-Hajek

Raw Service
MACE
Multi-attribute
Combinatorial
Auction.
Augmented
Proportional Share
Online Scheduling
Multi-attribute
Auction
Augmented
Proportional Share
Derivative Markets
Bargaining
Protocols

Complex Application
Service
Complex Service
MACE
Bargaining Protocols
Software-as-a-service

Online Scheduling
Bargaining Protocols
Software-as-a-service

Bargaining Protocols
Software-as-a-service

Table 6: Market Mechanisms Canon for Grids

In essence, the results of this paper suggest several natural and intriguing research
avenues:


Analyze the properties of the proposed mechanisms for the respective
application model classes.



Compare the efficiency of the market mechanisms attributed to the
different classes of the market mechanism canon.



Implement the mechanisms and conduct field studies in order to get real
data.



Develop market mechanisms, where the market mechanism canon is
mostly silent (e.g. task-oriented applications).



Develop sustainable business models for companies that provide market
platforms for trading Grid services or resources.
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Identify the size and the potential revenue of the single markets of the twotiered market structure.



Identify limits of the use of market mechanisms in Grid.
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